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BOOKS RECEIVED 581 
BOOK REVIEW 
Modern Trials. By Melvin M. Belli. Indianapolis : The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1954. 2763 pp. $50.00 
If the field of taxation has any rival for the title of being 
most written about, it must be that of procedure and trial practice. 
The art of persuasion is so all-pervasive in the law, and at the 
same time so subtle and elusive, that lawyers of all generations 
have been drawn to write about it as the flies are drawn to honey. 
The urge is no respecter of age-young and old have sought to 
solve the mysteries, and they remain unsolved. And these myster-
ies seem likely to remain so until our scientific brethren, the 
psychologists, have succeeded in delving much deeper into the 
problems of motivation and the reasons for human behavior. 
It is therefore true that a new book in this field usually is 
approached with a good deal of skepticism, as something to be 
skimmed through without much hope of acquiring anything new 
beyond an anecdote or so for the next bar meeting. Such anecdotes 
you will find aplenty in Mr. Belli's Modern Trials, but you will 
also find a great deal more. Not long ago one of my former stu-
dents came to me and said that one of the real needs he felt was 
for new ways to prove various propositions. It is precisely in this 
area that Mr. Belli has the most to offer. He is, of course, pri-
marily interested in showing how this can be done through the 
use of demonstrative techniques: pictures, maps, charts, models, 
illustrative drawings and real evidence. He gives literally hun-
dreds of examples, themselves amply illustrated by photographs, 
of how these techniques can be used to explain the propositions 
which counsel is called upon to get across to the jury; and in 
particular he shows much that is new in photography and medi-
cine. 
In large measure his examples are drawn from the field of 
personal injury litigation but there is no reason why the same 
techniques cannot be used in many other kinds of litigation. I 
doubt if any lawyer engaged in trial work can read this book 
without getting many new ideas which ·will help him in his trial 
work by suggesting more effective ways of descriptive proof. 
These ideas alone will be worth much more than the price of the 
book. 
Examples in the book cover problems both of liability and 
damages. They describe methods of demonstration through the 
witnesses-usually experts-who can thus bring home and explain 
their conclusions more clearly and therefore more persuasively. 
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These may be conclusions as to the manner in which an injury 
occurred or the nature and probable future course of the injury. 
It is in one sense a strong defense of the jury system that success 
in trial persuasion is predicated upon the assumption that the 
best persuasive device is the one which tries to explain as clearly 
as possible the basis for the party's claims. 
The author's examples also describe methods of using visual 
techniques to bolster the closing argument, where the primary 
emphasis is on the measure of damages-both special and general. 
These particular techniques involve the use of a blackboard on 
which suggested damage figures are written during the course 
of the argument or the use of charts which have been prepared 
in advance with similar suggested dollar figures. The items are 
separated for the various elements of the damages and then 
totalled. The underlying thought is to get the jury away from 
thinking in terms of a round figure for all damages lumped to-
gether; a totalling of several different items will presumably come 
to more than the lump sum. 
All of this material has been discussed, though nowhere else 
so completely or with such a wealth of illustration, in the innumer-
able trial clinics during the past ten years. It has been generally 
agreed that the damages granted by a jury in which such tech-
niques have been used by the plaintiff's lawyer are substantially 
higher than in past years. But it does not follow at all, as some 
would argue, that they are the sole cause for high verdicts, or 
that the means used are per se improper, or that the verdicts 
themselves are improper. If these techniques are used so as to 
persuade the jury toward a conclusion of liability based upon a 
clearer and better understood factual basis for the decision of 
what actually happened and how it should be evaluated within the 
proper legal framework, and if they are used to suggest to the 
jury those elements of damage which are properly and legally 
compensable, then there should be no complaint. This has been 
the trial attorney's proper business ever since the Anglo-Ameri-
can system of adversary jury trials was crystallized in its present 
form. Nor do I suppose that the mere appealing to the sympathies 
and passions of the jury on the issue of damages is improper. 
After all, pain, suffering and humiliation are not dispassionate 
things. Impropriety does lie, however, on two fairly well under-
stood points: (1) the jury should not decide the issue of liability 
because of the excessive sympathy they may feel for the plaintiff, 
nor out of prejudice against the defendant; and (2) the jury 
should not give an amount as damages which does not fairly repre-
sent the real financial injury-at least in a state which does not 
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recognize punitive damages. Nor is it proper for counsel to urge 
the jury to do so. 
It is therefore a matter of very real concern that judges 
should be careful to see that matters which are not specifically 
relevant are kept from the trial both in the evidence and in the 
argument stages. No less is it the duty of the iawyer to use an 
honest restraint, and I take it that this is the burden of Mr. 
DeLacy's speech before the Section on Insurance Law of the Ne-
braska State Bar Association in October, 1955.1 But it does not 
seem to me that a picture which illustrates pain is in any way 
irrelevant. It is perhaps unfortunate that the examples which 
Mr. Belli uses in his excellent book are almost invariably those in 
which a plaintiff has won. There is no reason why the same 
demonstrative techniques may not be used as effectively by the 
defense, as of course they have. The many examples in the litera-
ture of exposing malingering plaintiffs by moving pictures sug-
gest that the demonstrative device actually was pioneered by 
defendants. It should also be emphasized that Mr. Belli makes a 
special point of warning plaintiff's counsel against making claims 
which cannot be demonstrated to be accurate both as to liability 
and as to damage. If the damage figure in the petition is more 
than can be persuasively supported by evidence and argument, 
then it should be cut down before trial. Recent Nebraska cases2 
permitting the damage clause to be amended upward on proper 
motion after tiral has commenced should go far toward keeping 
these figures at a reasonable level at the outset. And this in 
turn should facilitate intelligent settlements. 
The book also contains a long section discussing various 
theories of liability which may be of great help. Only the insur-
ance companies can guess the number of accident cases which 
have gone uncompensated or which have been settled for relatively 
small amounts because the victim's lawyer utterly failed to realize 
the true basis of possible fault and liability. A rereading of this 
section from time to time will save many a lawyer, and will give 
him new ideas which the standard works on tort law make no 
pretense of covering adequately. 
There is another long section devoted to the explanation of 
a large number of medical problems. Although this does not take 
the place of a standard legal-medical te:i-."t, it shows in much 
l 35 Neb. L. Rev. 389 (1956). 
2 Gable v. Pathfinder Irrigation Dist., 159 Neb. 778, 68 N.W.2d 500 
(1955); see Kroeger v. Safranek, 161 Neb. 182, 72 N.W.2d 831 (1955); 
Dixon v. Coffey, 161 Neb. 487, 73 N.W.2d 660 (1955). 
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greater detail than those texts how a good many specific injuries. 
and diseases should be handled by the lawyer-doctor team. A 
number of medical reports are shown and discussed and a sepa-
rate chapter considers the special techniques which can be used 
to help the medical expert do his job as a witness. 
The chapters dealing with the examination and cross-exami-
nation of ordinary witnesses and the jury voir dire are very 
similar to those found in such standard works as Goldstein,3 
Busch,4 and Keeton, 5 though not as extensive. Though adequate 
they add nothing to the usually accepted folklore on the subjects. 
The chapter devoted to jury instructions gives a number of useful 
examples taken largely from the California Standard Instructions 
-an excellent compilation but one that of course must be used 
with a good deal of circumspection in any other state. On the 
other hand, this book contains one of the best discussions of the 
problems of settlement that I have found anywhere. The author's 
explanation of those problems which arise before trial are parti-
cularly helpful to the young lawyer who usually has had no warn-
ing of the pitfalls that await him. 
The treatment of the special verdict or special issue tech-
nique is hardly impressive. It consists of a short indictment of 
what he assumes is the general practice in Texas-though it is 
fashionable to ridicule the Texas practice of special issue sub-
mission it has its supporters even there. 6 There is no mention of 
the other states and federal courts where it is used with apparent 
success in many types of cases, or of the various special situations 
where certain purposes can be best accomplished only through 
this device.7 There seems to be a strange feeling among many 
practitioners that a procedural tool such as the federal special 
verdict, the summary judgment, or the pre-trial conference is 
either always good or always bad-as if a carpenter must throw 
away his cross-cut saw because it wouldn't do the job that only 
a coping saw could do. Such devices do have their special pur-
poses and are a great aid to the efficient administration of justice 
when used intelligently and with those purposes in mind. 
It should be pointed out that the burden of Mr. Belli's book, 
in fact that of any modern book on trial practice, where the 
3 Goldstein, Trial Technique (1938). 
4 Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trals, (1949). 
ti Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods, (1954). 
6 See Gray, A Rejoinder, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 514 (1956). 
7 See Matzke, Special Findings and Special Verdicts in Nebraska, 35 
Neb. L. Rev. 523 (1956). 
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emphasis is properly placed on adequate investigation and prepa-
ration, involves an assumption that, unfortunately, is not gener-
ally true. It assumes that somewhere there is the financial ability 
on behalf of the plaintiff to make the adequate investigation and 
preparation necessary to an intelligent and understanding settle-
ment or jury trial. Not only is this preparation expensive in 
terms of out-of-pocket expense and time of the attorney and his 
staff, but all too often the plaintiff can ill afford the delay neces-
sitated by such preparation even in a state where trial delay due 
to court congestion is not a problem. Mr. Belli believes that this 
problem is met by the use of the contingent fee (he recommends 
a flat one-third fee except for very unusual cases) and the con-
sequent financing of the preparation and delay by the attorney. 
There can be little doubt that such a method of financing litiga-
tion may run foul of many of the traditional notions of champerty 
and maintenance. It also may be doubted that this device is really 
helpful in the majority of cases, though in death cases I under-
stand that social security benefits have taken up some of the 
slack. Certainly the problem is worth the continued serious con-
sideration of the Bar if our present theories of liability and 
methods of enforcing them are to be continued.8 
At the risk of seeming to overemphasize the trivial faults of 
a truly helpful work, I cannot refrain from eA'J)ressing shock and 
amazement at a publisher who would key the index to section 
numbers and use no section numbers on the pages. But this is 
a small, though irritating, price to pay for a good book which 
must surely pay for itself many times over. 
David Dow9 
s See Conrad, The Impact of Expense on Injury Claims, Annals Am. 
Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci. 110 (May 1953). 
9 Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Nebraska. 
